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 “Learning from Others”:  English proposals for early years’ education and care reform and policy 
transfer from France and the Netherlands, 2010-2015 
 Introduction 
Early childhood education and care (ECEC) is widely seen as a key ‘social investment’ that allows 
countries to reap the economic benefits of mothers’ employment, and also to promote children’s 
development, and hence more equal life chances (e.g., Heckman, 2006; Esping-Andersen et al., 
2012; Author). However, ECEC systems differ cross-nationally and are historically rooted (Morgan, 
2002). Indeed, comparative work has highlighted the complexities of the main policy instruments by 
which ‘investment’ in ECEC is made, for example in the extent to which services are publicly funded, 
publicly provided and regulated (Author, Brennan et al., 2010; Plantenga, 2012; Penn, 2013; Mclean, 
2014) . 
In comparison with most of Western Europe, ECEC policy in the UKi  was slow to develop after the 
Second World War. The New Labour Government’s 1998 National Childcare Strategy was the first 
attempt to provide strategic direction in England, and between 1998 and 2010 expenditure on ECEC 
and the availability of ‘childcare’ii places increased hugely, largely due to Government funding for 
part-time early years education, together with some subsidy for additional hours of care (Author).  
It might have been anticipated that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition of 2010-15 would 
not continue to develop ECEC policy. Indeed following the financial and economic crisis of the late 
2000s, European comparative scholars predicted that the rise in social expenditure on childcare and 
other forms of ‘social investment’ (Hemerijck, 2012; Bonoli and Natali 2012) since the 2000s would 
falter.  However, Labour’s promises to extend the free hours of early years education for 3- and 4-
year-olds to 15 per week for 38 weeks a year, together with an extension to disadvantaged 2-year-
olds, were honoured. Furthermore, the Coalition continued to try to tackle the availability, 
affordability and quality of childcare, which have been commonly agreed to be the main policy 
issues by English childcare policy documents since the mid-2000s (HMT et al., 2004), by academics 
(e.g. Gambaro et al., 2014), and by trans-national organisations (OECD, 2006; EC, 2011).  
More surprisingly still, the Conservative-led Coalition also appealed to what they regarded as similar 
Dutch and French policies and practices to support their two key policy proposals:  first, to increase 
the number of (self-employed) childminders by establishing ‘childminder agencies’ and second, to 
relax the staff/children ratios for childminders and other private providers  measures intended to 
tackle the issues of availability, affordability and quality. Indeed, the title of a policy speech by 
Elizabeth Truss, the (Conservative) Minister for Childcare made to accompany the launch of these 
proposals  was ‘Learning from Others’ (Truss, 2013a). Even though the UK has been by any measure 
a laggard in developing childcare policy, it was nevertheless relatively unusual in any field of 
policymaking to find explicit reference of this kind to other European countries (Rose, 1991; Legrand, 
2015).   
While there appears to be continuity of commitment to ECEC in the form of the Coalition’s 
acceptance of Labour Party policy, bolstered by a preparedness to transfer ECEC policies from other 
Western European countries, the Coalition nevertheless approached the development of ECEC policy 
very differently from Labour. The Coalition’s overarching policy goal  in proposing further ECEC 
reform was to promote childcare businesses within its wider framework of commitment to develop 
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markets in human services (Author). Thus both its motivation and its vision for the development of 
the ECEC system differed profoundly from other Western European countries.  
We seek to understand the transfer of the two ECEC policies from the Netherlands and  France and 
to explore why neither was successful. We have undertaken historical analysis of government 
documents relating to the two key policy developments for both England and France, asking the 
‘who, what and why’ questions that are fundamental to the work of historians and also to some 
political scientists (e.g. Dolowitz, 2017). For England we have also analysed House of Commons’ 
Debates and Ministerial speeches and secondary published material, produced by government, think 
tanks and pressure groups. For the Netherlands we have relied mainly on secondary published work 
in English.  The first substantive section offers a ‘thick description’ (Ryle, 1949; Geertz, 1973) of the 
key English ECEC reforms in the UK, alongside the extent and nature of the appeal to follow the 
example of the Dutch and French. Following McConnell’s (2015: 237) working definition of failure: 
‘namely that a policy fails, even if it is successful in some minimal respects, if it does not 
fundamentally achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or 
support is virtually non-existent’, we show that both policies failed albeit at different stages. The first 
(childminder agencies) although enacted, failed rapidly to increase the number of childminders, 
which was a specific aim of the policy; and the government chose not to enact the second policy 
(relaxed ratios). We examine the way in which domestic actors mobilised against these proposed 
policies, and look more closely at how other countries’ policies and practices were invoked. In 
particular, we use the literature on policy learning and policy transfer to understand the failure in 
more depth, in terms both of the motivation of the UK Government and its lack of due attention to 
context in the form of the very different underpinnings of the English, Dutch and French childcare 
systems.  
ECEC policy development in England and ‘learning from others’  
The Coalition’s approach to ECEC policy development was set out clearly in 2012 and 2013 by the 
Conservative Minister for childcare. Her proposals were designed primarily to promote availability 
and affordability by first, increasing the number of (self-employed) childminders and second, by 
relaxing the staff/children ratios for childminders and other private providers. The proposed changes 
were designed to shift the balance from provision in formal settings towards cheaper home-based 
care by childminders, iii  and to address the main issues  in childcare provision, quality included, by 
‘cutting red tape’ and relaxing regulations. 
 (i)’Learning from Others’: reforming childminding  
Before becoming Minister responsible for childcare, Truss had identified the failings of Labour’s ECEC 
policy as a loss of flexibility and high costs for parents. In particular: ‘One of the major causes of the 
massive childcare inflation over the last decade has been the squeezing-out of childminders, the 
most affordable and flexible providers’ (Truss 2012a). Identifying the main policy goal as increasing 
mothers’ employment (over and above child development), Truss also referred to the Dutch creation 
of local ‘childminder agencies’ (which train, support and monitor the childminders who care for 
children under 4) and the way in which they had resulted in an increase in childminder numbers and 
childcare affordability, while at the same time the labour participation rate of Dutch mothers with 
children under three had overtaken their English counterparts (albeit that the proportion of Dutch 
women working part-time and often relatively few hours was greater). In 2013, the creation of 
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childminder agencies emerged as a key policy proposal, aimed primarily at increasing availability and 
affordability, but also, it was suggested, at improving quality.  
In England, the extension of the free early education entitlement to 15 hours a week for 3- and 4-
year-olds and to the most disadvantaged 2-year-olds from 2013 had brought the availability of 
places to the top of the political agenda, while affordability in terms of the cost to parents of extra 
hours of care continued to be problematic.  Borg and Stocks (2013) found that a third of parents who 
were not in work or working part-time could not afford the formal childcare necessary to increase 
their hours.  
Despite the fact that registered childminders were more likely to offer flexible hours and also tended 
to provide the most affordable early years education and care, their numbers had decreased, from 
103,000 in 1996 to 57,000 in 2010, stabilised between 2010 and 2011, and then continued to decline 
(Brind et al., 2014). The reasons for this are generally agreed to have included discontent on the part 
of childminders with both their pay and job security, and more diverse opportunities for women 
seeking employment (e.g. Faith et al., 2011), as well as the introduction of  the Early Years 
Foundation Stage in 2008 and an obligatory ‘curriculum’. 
 
Because of their low overheads and generally lower qualifications, the fees charged by childminders 
have always been somewhat less than those charged by formal ECEC settings. Thus the immediate 
policy issue addressed by the Minister was to increase the number of places available by increasing 
the number of childminders, who would also become a real alternative to formal childcare provision, 
thus alleviating the costs to parents. In the mid-2010s, the Minister framed the issues of ECEC 
provision in terms of failing to secure value for money, arguing that increasing the number of 
childminders would help in this respect. She praised the radical Dutch reform of childcare that had 
taken place in 2005 (which instigated demand-side funding and put provision of all early years care 
into the private market sector (Plantenga, 2012)), stating that while it was  
not appropriate to import an entire model from another country…aspects of the Dutch 
reforms, especially the [childminder] agency structure could be beneficial for improving the 
value for money of childcare in Britain. In particular, it could enable the provision of more 
childminding places improving affordability and availability (Truss 2012b: 7).  
It was also clear that Truss saw in the Dutch decentralised model of childminder agencies the 
possibility for the English inspection agency, Ofsted, to inspect the agencies rather than individual 
childminders, and so reduce costs (Truss, 2012b).  
The Dutch model for childminders works via ‘gastouder’ (‘guest parents’) agencies, which register all 
childminders and informal caregivers, such as grandparents (so long as they also care for children 
who are not kin). They are responsible for controlling qualifications (requiring a minimum three year 
post-18 qualification in care and welfare), the health and safety aspects of the childminder’s home, 
the maximum number of children they care for at any one time (4 children under the age of 12), and 
also their financial accountability and insurance status. The Dutch agencies act as ‘one-stop shops’ 
for parents and childminders. They administer the fees charged by childminders and also provide 
support, training and advice. In turn, they levy a small fee on the childminders. However, they are 
not privately run as was being proposed for England, but instead are funded by the state and 
employers (Author). 
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But, as Cooke and Henehan (2012) pointed out,  while the numbers of Dutch childminders increased 
200% between 2004 and 2008, this was due in large part to grandparents taking advantage of their 
new right to public subsidies as carers (see also Lloyd, 2012). Furthermore, the overall quality of 
Dutch childcare had declined significantly, with the percentage of providers judged unsatisfactory 
increasing from 6% to 49% between 2001 and 2008 (Plantenga, 2012). Cooke and Henehan (2012) 
expressed particular concern about the dilution of individual childminder inspection in the 
Netherlands.  
Nevertheless, the creation of childminder agencies was included in the Coalition’s main ECEC 
document  ‘More Great Childcare’ (DfE, 2013a).  In contrast to the Netherlands, the proposed 
agencies would help childminders with setting up a business, matching childminders and parents, 
and arranging cover in times of illness. They were not intended to offer support (something that was 
a local authority responsibility, albeit subject to austerity cuts).  However, the agencies would offer 
sixteen hours of continuous professional development training per year. Childminder agencies 
would, it was argued, aid the entry of new childminders to the ECEC market and also raise the 
quality of their provision (notwithstanding the lack of a support role), as well as making inspection 
cheaper. However, perhaps in response to the criticism of the Dutch model, reference was also 
made to ‘similar’ arrangements for childminders that existed in France, a country with a well-
regarded, but very different publicly provided and financed ECEC system (Fagnani and Lloyd, 2013; 
Author). iv 
However, the French ‘equivalent’ to childminder agencies, which were neither named nor discussed 
in the text of the UK Government document, bore relatively little resemblance to the proposals for 
English agencies.  The ‘relais assistantes maternelles’ (RAMs – ‘childminding support centres’ 
(Fagnani and Lloyd, 2013)) began to be developed in 1989 and were legally constituted in 2005. 
There are about 3000 of them, distributed unevenly throughout France (ONPE, 2015). They provide 
a place where parents and childminders can meet, activities for children, and act as a resource 
centre for childminders, supporting them in their practice; the manager of the RAM has a 
qualification in early childhood.v Inspection is focused on the individual childminder and while 
childminders sign a contract with parents, childminding remains a public service in France (Fagnani, 
2012). 
The support offered by the RAMs is thus confined to everyday practice; all aspects of childminder 
regulation and funding are undertaken by the state, while the RAMs are the responsibility of the 
Caisse D’Allocations Familiales (the family branch of the French social security system). Indeed, the 
RAMs bear more of a resemblance to the ‘Childminder Networks’ set up by the Labour Government 
in the 2000s to improve the quality of everyday practice than to the agencies proposed in 2013 
(Author). Furthermore, the largest expansion in French childminder numbers took place in the 
1990s, when RAMs were only just beginning to be developed, with a rise from 69,400 in 1990 to 
232,200 in 2000. This was largely due to the determination of the French Government to take this 
work out of the unregulated market (travail non-déclaré) to the advantage of childminders, who 
gained paid holiday and social security entitlements; the state, which could collect income tax 
(Martin et al., 1998); and parents who were reimbursed for a substantial part of their costs via a new 
benefit (Fagnani, 2012). Legislation passed in 2004 to enhance the profession has also increased the 
numbers.  In 2013, nearly 327,000 childminders were employed by parents and cared for 19% of 
children under 3 (ONPE, 2015).  
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English childminder agencies began to be set up in 2014, but by February 2016 there were only eight 
registered agencies.  The reaction to them by both the childminders’ professional association, the 
Professional Association for Childhood and Early Years (PACEY), and  parents, particularly the web-
based group ‘Netmums’, was highly critical. Childminders expressed concern about the development 
of a two-tier service, comprised of those in agencies and those who remained in independent 
practice, with two different types of regulation. In a survey carried out in 2013, 77% of the 
respondents identified a conflict between the drive of the agencies to make a profit and the quality 
of childminder practice (Parker, 2013). They also feared that the agencies would charge much larger 
fees than Ofsted for simple registration, meaning that the cost would have to be passed to parents.  
‘Netmums’ reported that 80% of the parents replying to their online survey said that the regulation 
of individual childminders by Ofsted gave them confidence; 75% said they would be less likely to use 
an agency than an independent childminder (PACEY, 2013).  
English childminder agencies were conceived above all as a means to promote childminder 
businesses, whereas their role in the Netherlands went beyond this, with the agencies themselves 
funded by the state and employers, while in France the RAMs offered mainly support to 
childminders, who remained part of the predominantly publicly provided and financed ECEC system.  
(ii)’Learning from Others’: relaxing the ratios 
A move to relax the ratios of staff to children for all forms of early years care and education was also 
put forward in 2013, for which the examples of the Netherlands and particularly France were again 
cited. The Coalition Government was committed to de-regulating the childcare market as a means to 
promoting its growth. Furthermore, the idea of relaxing the ratios became central to the 
Government’s argument that it could tackle all three of the main issues bedevilling ECEC policy – 
availability, affordability and quality – by easing the burden of regulation placed on the childcare 
market.  
In 2012, it was argued that relaxing ratios would increase the numbers of childminders and reduce 
childcare costs (by allowing each childminder to take more children). For example, for children under 
one the staff/child ratio was 1:2 in the Netherlands and 1:1 in England. Truss used what became a 
well-worn example when she drew attention to the fact that childminders would not be able to care 
for twins if they were under one (Truss, 2013b). As Cooke and Henehan (2012) observed, there was 
no mention of the fact that Dutch childminders were trained to a much higher standard than their 
English counterparts.  Indeed, the whole early years’ workforce in England has low qualifications 
compared to most other Western European countries (DfE, 2013b; EC et al., 2014).  
At the turn of 2012/2013, Truss argued that England had ‘the most restrictive adult-child ratios’ in 
relation to ‘comparable European countries’ (Truss, 2013c) in all ECEC settings. Here the argument 
shifted somewhat to relaxing ratios in order to allow professionals more freedom in their practice 
(Truss 2012c). It was also felt that by bringing in more fees paid by parents, a relaxation would 
enable staff salaries to be increased, thus permitting the recruitment and retention of better 
qualified people (Truss, 2013c).  
The government document ‘More Great Childcare’ (DfE, 2013a) advocated relaxing staff/child ratios 
for all forms of ECEC. In the case of 2-year-olds, the Minister proposed relaxing the ratio for 
childminders to match that in formal institutional settings.vi  Ratios used in other countries, including 
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France and the Netherlands were cited to support her case. However, these figures were misleading 
as they were not closely linked to another crucial contextual factor pertinent to both the Dutch and 
French ECEC systems: the higher qualifications held by staff. In the Netherlands, childminders, like all 
early years workers, are required to have three years of training beyond the upper secondary 
education level. In France, they are required to undertake 120 hours of training, paid for by the 
state, in various aspects of childcare and development, 60 hours after their initial inspection which 
entitles them to practice, and a further 60 hours during their first two years of work.  Continuing 
professional development is also funded by the state. In contrast, English childminders are only 
required to undergo an inspection by Ofsted and to take an initial course, which may amount to as 
little as 18 hours on how to set up a home-based childcare service and paediatric first aid, for which 
they usually pay, vii although some local authorities provide it free of charge.viii 
In the case of early years institutional settings for 3- and 4-year-olds in England, the existing ratio 
was 1:8, but the presence of a qualified teacher allowed this to move to 1:13.ix This was compared to 
ratios of 1:8 in the Netherlands, and 1:8 or 1:26 (when led by a teacher) in France (DfE, 2013b: 19). 
But information regarding qualifications was not wholly correct. Thus, in France, a minimum of 40% 
of staff in formal early years settings must have a 12 month diploma, and some staff, including 
managers, will have higher qualifications. Furthermore, no ratios are stipulated for écoles 
maternelles (IGEN and IGAENR, 2011); these employ a fully qualified teacher (with, since 2010, a 
Master’s degree) and an assistant for parts of the day (Eurydice, 2015; Author; Fagnani, 2014). In 
England, although virtually all state nursery classes and schools had at least one member of staff 
qualified to degree level in 2013, the figure was only 13% in formal (usually private) childcare 
settings (Brind et al., 2014). 
The Minister thus saw an opportunity to encourage the employment of teachers:  their capacity to 
take more children would offset their higher pay and also drive up quality: ‘providers will only be 
able to operate with more children per adult if they employ high quality staff’ (DfE, 2013a: 8 and 29). 
Evaluations of quality in English ECEC settings had provided clear evidence that  (the small amount) 
of state provision in the form of nursery schools in particular – which all employed trained teachers - 
secured better long-term outcomes for children (Sylva et al., 2004). The Labour Government’s 
response had been to provide earmarked funds to support staff training and to increase the number 
of graduates, however these were abandoned by the Coalition Government (Author).   
‘More Great Childcare’ promised that the Government would ‘consult on exactly what qualification 
requirements will enable providers to operate our proposed higher ratios’ (DfE, 2013a: 30). While 
the document cited research findings that better qualifications (particularly the leadership provided 
by a graduate (Mathers et al., 2010)) are crucial to outcomes for children, the Government was very 
far from advocating the kind of highly trained workforce that was common in other countries, the 
Netherlands and France included.  Truss cited a letter from the special advisor on education policy at 
the OECD, in support of the UK Government’s approach to improving qualifications (HC, 2013a), but 
the letter was carefully equivocal, noting only that the best early education systems prioritise the 
quality of staff over class sizes (Schleicher, 2013). 
There was concerted opposition to relaxing ratios from a variety of policy actors – academics, 
parents and private sector providers – who came together to back the ‘Rewind on Ratios’ campaign 
(HC, 2013b, col. 231). Cathy Nutbrown who had been commissioned to review the  qualifications of 
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the ECEC workforce (Nutbrown, 2012) published a report opposing any relaxation in the ratios 
(Nutbrown, 2013); and academics closely associated with research on child outcomes defended the 
existing ratios as a means to providing better support for children’s language and learning 
development (Eisenstadt et al., 2013).  
Opposition by private providers was also intense. The Pre-School Learning Alliance (PSLA) criticised 
the model used to predict that relaxing ratios would result in a substantial (28%) drop in fees 
charged (DfE, 2013c), pointing out that the figure was based on the false assumption that providers 
were open for 52 weeks a year at 100% occupancy and also failed to make any allowance for 
investment in future staff training (PSLA, 2013). A survey of the Alliance’s members showed 
additionally that 94% did not believe that they would be able to maintain quality standards if staffing 
levels fell (NCB, 2013), while the childminders’ professional body reported  93% of their members 
saying that if they got more money by taking more children, they would not reduce fees for parents 
(Parker, 2013). The director of the Busy Bees private for-profit childcare chain opposed change to 
the ratios (Jozwiak,2013), while the managing director of the Bright Horizons childcare chain said 
that ‘much of the time’ a 1:8 ratio continued to be necessary even when a teacher was present 
(Family and Childcare Trust, 2014). Most damagingly, the Liberal Democrat Coalition partners 
withdrew their support in face of this opposition (HC, 2013b, cols. 236-7) and this proposal for de-
regulation was dropped.  
The main reason why the debate over ratios was so intense was that the Minister responsible for 
childcare saw it as a particularly important opportunity to tackle all the main issues of affordability, 
availability and quality while also promoting the ECEC market by deregulation:  the higher ratio 
permitted by the presence of a teacher would make it possible to take more children, which in turn 
would financially benefit private providers and hence it was hoped, both parents (by making it 
possible to lower the fees charged) and staff (by making it possible to raise pay), thus securing better 
quality childcare (DfE, 2013a, 2015). However, as the debate over the ratios showed, these 
assumptions were optimistic in respect of a system reliant on private providers. 
 Policy Transfer 
Truss’s use of ‘learning’ in the title of her 2013 speech referred to learning from practices in other 
countries. But there are many dimensions and interpretations of policy learning (Stone, 2004; 
Dunlop, 2017). In an influential article Hall (1993: 278) stated that policy learning may be seen ‘as a 
deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and 
new information’, although as Greener (2002) observed, in practice policy learning is about 
adaptation of ideas or techniques to local circumstances.  Hall (1993) also said that policy learning 
may result in a more coherent transfer of ideas, policies and practices, whereas mere copying may 
well be ad hoc and piecemeal. This is to infer that learning is accompanied by deeper understanding 
than the kind of policy transfer that consists essentially of the ‘policy pinching’ (Deleon and Resnick-
Terry, 1999; Dwyer and Ellison, 2009) that characterised English ECEC development under the 
Coalition.  
Motivation and Context 
Indeed, policy transfer may be undertaken by a variety of actors for very different reasons (Bennett, 
1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). However, the literature on policy transfer has shown that this may 
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take many forms and may be motivated in many different ways. In England the ECEC reform 
proposals were made, as we have seen, by a Minister seeking a solution to particular policy issues 
(see also Dwyer and Ellison, 2009) – namely, the availability, affordability and quality of childcare – 
initially in conjunction with Policy Exchange, a think tankx, and referenced practices in the 
Netherlands and France to justify and legitimise the proposals for change.  As Bennett (1991: 38) has 
said, the policy experience of other countries can be used to legitimise conclusions already reached:  
‘Evidence is used in the policy process in highly selective ways to reinforce positions and to 
legitimate decisions already taken…with little regard to accepted canons of methodological 
reliability and validity…’.   The result can be, as Marmor (2017) has observed, ‘mis-learning’ rather 
than learning, and ‘naïve transplantation’. 
However, opposition on the part of parents and providers to the proposed policy transfers stemmed 
from the very different nature of the ECEC system in England which made these transfers 
inappropriate. The importance of context has been stressed in the literature. Effective policy 
learning and lesson drawing takes context on board, as Gornick and Meyers (2004) argued in their 
article on the possibilities for the US to learn from the European experience of parental leave (see 
also Page, 2000).  However, policy transfer to legitimise a particular position is likely to ignore the 
nature of contextual differences (Wolman, 1992), particularly in the public/private mix in provision, 
and the fact that contextual factors are inter-related (Phillips, 2012), particularly in respect of the 
importance of staff qualifications. Both of these are likely to make implementation difficult.  Deleon 
and Resnick-Terry (1999) have argued that successful ‘policy pinching’ only happens if the contextual 
issue is given due consideration. Even if the broad policy goals (to encourage mothers’ labour market 
participation and children’s development) and the policy issues for ECEC (of availability, affordability 
and quality) are similar, insufficient attention to differences in context will likely render the policy 
transfer ‘inappropriate’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). As Hulme (2005: 488) has commented policies 
and practices may not be transferable ‘since they have grown out of the legal, educational and social 
systems of their “host state”.’   
Contributions to the policy transfer literature have been criticised for an overly rationalist and linear 
approach, and for paying insufficient attention to the complexity and the politics of the process by 
which transferred policies are ‘translated’ into practice (e.g. Freeman, 2009; Stone, 2012, 2016; 
Clarke et al., 2015; Peck and Theodore, 2015;  Dunlop, 2017). Nevertheless, they do provide a useful 
framework for a fine-tuned policy analysis, which, if it is also to investigate the crucial question of 
differences in context between the lending and borrowing countries,  requires the kind of ‘thick 
description’ that we have provided in the last section (see also, de Jong, 2009).  
Discussion and Conclusion: inappropriate policy transfer 
The Coalition sought to justify their ECEC policy proposals by appealing to Dutch and French policies 
and practices. However, the differences between these three ECEC systems and in the workings of 
the particular parts of those systems that the UK wanted to transfer was such that it was impossible 
either to justify the  appeal in the first place or to expect successful transfer. The first section has 
shown the extent to which the Coalition ignored evidence from the Netherlands and France about 
the nature of the policies they wanted to transfer, how they fitted into the wider ECEC systems, and 
how the characteristics of those systems – most importantly the extent of public and private 
provision and the higher qualifications of the ECEC staff – related to them.   
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Above all, the Coalition Government wanted to solve the issue of securing availability, affordability 
and good quality ECEC within the framework of the existing English system of largely private 
providers, by actively promoting ‘childcare businesses’ and freeing market providers from ‘red tape’ 
by pursuing de-regulation. While comparative analysis of ECEC policies has drawn attention to the 
possibilities of policy transfer (e.g.  Gornick and Meyers, 2004), the case of transfer that is studied in 
this paper was subject to politics that harnessed the policies to different policy preoccupations – in 
particular to the overarching goal of promoting markets – while ignoring the context in terms of the  
differences in the nature of the childcare systems.  
The attempt to transfer the childminder agency model from the Netherlands and, it was said, 
France, stemmed from the desire to increase the number of childminders, who tended to be 
cheaper than formal childcare provision and who also offered more ‘flexible’ care, which helped  
mothers especially fulfil their paid work commitments and to increase their working hours. A 
relaxation in ratios appeared to offer the possibility of squaring the availability, affordability and 
quality circle by making heroic assumptions as to how any extra income gained by private providers 
(including childminders) of ECEC would be spent. The failure of the attempts to ‘transfer’ 
childminder agencies and less favourable staff/child ratios from the Dutch and French childcare 
systems was due above all to the inappropriateness of abstracting these particular elements, which 
had been established within different ECEC systems for different reasons and purposes. While the 
responsible Minister eschewed copying the whole Dutch or French ECEC systems, context also 
matters in any attempt to import any dimension of policy.  
The Coalition first used the Netherlands, where childcare for children under 4 is provided by private 
for-profit and not-for-profit providers (Author) – to legitimise its policy proposals. England and the 
Netherlands were late to adopt ECEC policies and in both the market plays a large role in provision 
(Plantenga, 2012; Penn, 2013). To this extent the appeal to the Dutch example could be defended in 
terms of the broad similarities of the two ECEC systems (Cox, 1993).  However, the motivation for 
establishing agencies in England and the kind of agency that was proposed differed.  In England, the 
immediate policy issue was availability and the decreasing number of childminders.  It was thought 
that the creation of childminder agencies would make it easier for them to set up their businesses. 
However, the  increase in the numbers of childminders in the Netherlands owed most to the new 
subsidies given to informal carers, particularly grandparents. Increasing the affordability of childcare 
was also an important goal in both countries, but childminder agencies had little to do with this in 
the Netherlands.  Indeed in the Netherlands as in England, the level of government subsidies to 
parents buying care was a key factor in determining affordability for parents, and in both countries 
these were cut (Yerkes, 2014; Stewart and Obolenskaya, 2015). The Dutch agencies serve both kin 
carers and self-employed childminders. They were not set up as for-profit entities, and while 
childminders pay fees to cover inspection and monitoring, these were substantially less than were 
envisaged for English agencies.  In addition, Dutch childminders are obliged to have the same 
qualifications as all childcare workers, which means that they tend to be substantially better 
qualified than their English counterparts. Above all, the focus of English policymakers, unlike the 
Dutch, who backed away from a market approach after 2005, was placed squarely on the role of 
agencies in assisting new childminders to enter the childcare market.   
The attraction of any appeal to French ‘childminder agencies’ lay in the fact that it was a country 
commonly  to have a highly regarded ECEC system, but it lacked a defensible rationale both at the 
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level of the ECEC system and at the level of the particular part of provision that was to be 
transferred. It is impossible to avoid the fact that the whole French ECEC system, overwhelmingly 
publicly provided and funded, is fundamentally different from the English system, which relies on 
both public money and unregulated parents’ fees for early years care, and predominantly private 
providers. Thus, entities which could be identified as performing a somewhat similar role to what 
was being proposed for England – the RAMs – operated entirely differently in practice. While 
proposals for English reforms were conceived in a framework that presumed that the state would 
play as small a role as possible in provision and in regulating the market, the French state assumed 
an ongoing role in stimulating provision with, for example, grants for new childminders to help meet 
the required standards for childcare in the home, and financial support for established childminders 
wishing to enlarge their practice (ONPE, 2015). The RAMs bore little relation to the English proposals 
for childminder agencies: their role is one of support, with highly qualified managers committed to 
raising the quality of practice. Furthermore, it was above all the formalisation of childminders’ work 
and state provision of new ways in which to compensate parents who hired childminders that had 
increased their numbers, not the French ‘agencies’.  
 
The issue of relaxing staff to child ratios was central to the English Minister’s wider strategy for 
addressing the main issues of availability, affordability and quality via de-regulation of the ECEC 
market. The more relaxed ratios operating in the Netherlands and France were used to legitimise the 
proposals for England. However securing quality, ever the Achilles’ heel of markets for human 
services, proved the main impediment to this policy. While the Minister recognised that English ECEC 
staff were disproportionately low qualified and low paid compared to both their Dutch and French 
counterparts,  for whom the training and qualifications of all staff (childminders included) are much 
more strictly regulated, the implications of this for relaxing ratios were not properly considered.  
Rather, the Minister’s hopes regarding quality rested on private providers using the extra money 
that was thought would result from higher ratios to hire better qualified and better paid staff.  In the 
debate following the proposals, private providers themselves made it clear that this was unlikely.  
Both proposed policies– childminder agencies and relaxed ratios – were transferred to legitimise 
policy decisions made by the Coalition Government. Successes of the Dutch and French ECEC 
systems were invoked to support ‘learning from others’. Predictable problems of implementing 
transfer, which stemmed from the differences in context, were ignored.  The overarching policy goal 
in England was to encourage the growth of the childcare market, which was assumed to be the 
framework within which all policy development would take place.  While the Dutch Government 
backed away from the 2005 decision to leave quality control substantially to the market, in England, 
confidence in the childcare market to deliver on all three of the main issues – availability, 
affordability and quality - remained undimmed. However, the attempts to set up childminder 
agencies and to relax ratios were both opposed by parents and providers on the grounds that they 
would be detrimental to quality.  For a while there was some effort to raise the level of qualifications 
– crucial to achieving quality – but it fell far short of both the Netherlands and France. Furthermore, 
the desire to promote childcare businesses became even stronger over time and was, despite the 
absence of evidence, held to have the power to address all the fundamental problems of availability, 
affordability and quality. But promotion of a childcare market was not the motivation for 
childminder agencies or relaxed ratios in either the Netherlands or France. Nevertheless, the 
Conservative Ministers responsible for ECEC in 2013 and in 2015, made it clear that the Government 
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wished to encourage ‘childcare businesses’ (HC, 2013b, col. 229), and that childminder agencies 
were regarded as ‘commercial organisations, independent of government’ (Gyimah, 2015). Similarly, 
the intention to ‘free’ the childcare market from excessive regulatory ‘red tape’, including the 
relaxation of staff/child ratios marked out the English Government’s overarching policy goal as 
different from its continental counterparts. While ECEC had become embedded as a policy and 
Labour’s reforms were accepted by the Coalition, a role for the state beyond financing early years 
education and subsiding early years care (to a reduced extent) was not. 
This case of policy transfer manifests little by way of learning in the sense of understanding how the 
policies worked in practice in the lending countries and the complexities inherent in transferring 
them. Rather it provides evidence of yet another attempt to find a ‘quick fix’ e.g. (Hulme, 2005), by 
this time looking to continental Europe rather than the US. While the more recent policy transfer 
literature has stressed the complexity of the process of transfer, this case was more one of ‘naïve 
transplantation’ (Marmor, 2017). The policy changes were communicated in a top-down fashion by 
the Minister. Key professional actors and interests were not incorporated into the process of 
transfer (see also Park et al., 2014), and their opposition proved decisive. The attempt to relax ratios 
failed completely while the development of childminder agencies was slow, such that the Chief 
Executive of the PSLA commented that ‘with only eight childminder agencies registered after two 
years, it is clear that this initiative is a damp squib and has done nothing to stem the flow of 
childminders exiting the sector’ (Nursery World, 2016). Above all, the Minister failed to appreciate 
the major differences in the national contexts for the two policy changes, particularly in terms of the 
overarching policy goal, which in England alone centred on marketisation and looser regulation.   
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i
 ECEC policy is devolved in the UK; some policy dimensions remain UK-wide and some differ (Author). 
ii
 The 2006 Childcare Act included early years education in the term ‘childcare’, allowing policymakers to 
conflate early years education and early years care. 
iii
 In 2012-13, 25% of 0-2 year-olds attended private (for-profit or not-for-profit) settings; 7% a nursery school 
or class; and 6% were looked after by a childminder. 35% of 3-4 year olds attended nursery schools or classes; 
22% reception classes in primary schools; 31% private providers; and 5% were cared for by a childminder 
(Huskinson et al., 2014). 
iv
 Provision for children under 3 is provided by home-based childminders (assistant(e)s maternel(le)s agréé(e)s) 
and by centre-based provision particularly crèches; a small proportion of 2-year-olds attend nursery schools 
(écoles maternelles) which are attended by virtually all 3-5-year-olds (IGEN and IGAENR, 2014; ONPE, 2015).  
v
 This involves three years study beyond the age of 18. 
vi
 With ratios increased from 1:3 to 1:4.  
vii
 See for example, Seine et Marne (2015) for France and Wandsworth (2016) for England.  
viii
 Longer initial training courses, for example that offered by the childminders’ professional organisation 
(which constituted part of a level 3 diploma), costs the childminder £220. 
ix
 4-year-olds entering primary schools in the year in which they turn five, could be in classes of up to 30. 
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x
 Stone (2004) has stressed the importance of these, and Peck and Theodore (2015) have drawn attention to 
the possibility for ‘fast-policy’ development. 
